April 06, 2008

Iran: On The Sunni Side of the Street

Oh... the Shia gall of it.

A couple of weeks ago, under the prompting of his best bud Joe Lieberman (D-Semi Sane), Senator John McCain (R-Semi Detached) apologized for pointing out that SHIA Muslim Iran helps, trains and supports SUNNI Muslim al-Qaeda.

McCain seemed to think he "misspoke." He didn't.

Remember the 2004 Democrat Bible? The 9/11 Commission Report?

Those were the days when you could hit a hysterical Democrat screaming about the report.

When it was politically expedient to complain that Bush hadn't INSTANTLY implemented every last proposal. This was the equivalent of the word of God.

No one mentions it these days. McCain should start by reading the following pages...


In June 1996, an enormous truck bomb detonated in the Khobar Towers residential complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, that housed U.S.Air Force personnel. Nineteen Americans were killed, and 372 were wounded. The operation was carried out principally, perhaps exclusively, by Saudi Hezbollah, an organization that had received support from the government of Iran (SHIA). While the evidence of Iranian involvement is strong there are also signs that al Qaeda (SUNNI) played some role, as yet unknown.

Sudan’s Islamist leader,Turabi, who convened a series of meetings under the label Popular Arab and Islamic Conference around the time of Bin Ladin’s arrival in that country. Delegations of violent Islamist extremists came from all the groups represented in Bin Ladin’s Islamic Army Shura. Representatives also came from organizations such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, Hamas, and Hezbollah.

Turabi sought to persuade Shiites and Sunnis to put aside their divisions and join against the common enemy. In late 1991 or 1992, discussions in Sudan between al Qaeda and Iranian operatives led to an informal agreement to cooperate in providing support — even if only training—for actions carried out primarily against Israel and the United States.

Not long afterward, senior al Qaeda operatives and trainers traveled to Iran to receive training in explosives. In the fall of 1993, another such delegation went to the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon for further training in explosives as well as in intelligence and security. Bin Ladin reportedly showed particular interest in learning how to use truck bombs such as the one that had killed 241 U.S. Marines in Lebanon in 1983.

The relationship between al Qaeda and Iran demonstrated that Sunni-Shia divisions did not necessarily pose an insurmountable barrier to cooperation in terrorist operations. As will be described in chapter 7, al Qaeda contacts with Iran continued in ensuing years.

PAGE 128
Though intelligence gave no clear indication of what might be afoot, some intelligence reports mentioned chemical weapons, pointing toward work at a camp in southern Afghanistan called Derunta. On November 4, 1998, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York unsealed its indictment of Bin Ladin, charging him with conspiracy to attack U.S. defense installations.

The indictment also charged that al Qaeda (SUNNI) had allied itself with Sudan, Iran, and Hezbollah (SHIA).


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